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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a coun-try where one party, the Communist Party, notonly lays claim to a monopoly on the exercise of
power but also to the production and distribution of ideol-
ogy. This includes the narration and interpretation of His-
tory, and consequently the forging of the collective mem-
ory. In the Maoist epoch, the interpretation of History was
closely linked to many political struggles. To give two ex-
amples from the period that concerns us here, the Cultural
Revolution started with a debate over a Ming dynasty offi-
cial, Hai Rui, and a few years later, Mao launched his
Movement to Criticise Lin Biao and Confucius. The latter
amalgamation of a Red Army leader who had recently
died after an alleged plot, and the ancient sage who had
been a pillar of the imperial order for about two millennia,
perplexed not only foreign observers but also the Chinese
themselves. 
History  exc lusive ly  in  the se rv ic e of  pol it i cs
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has re-
vealed very little about its own history, preferring to leave it
locked up in the mysterious “Central Committee archives,“
Mao had felt as early as the Yan’an period the need to as-
sert his supreme political control over the “correct” version
of the Party’s history. This was one of the objectives of the
Rectification Movement of 1942, which found expression in
1945 in the “Resolution concerning several historical ques-
tions.“ This text not only institutionalised and legitimised the
cult of Mao within the Party but it also set the pattern for
the Party’s way of dealing with History.((1) In this approach,
Since the Communist Party of China published its brief official version of the Cultural Revolution in 1981, few works
on the history of that period have been approved for publication, even if they have kept strictly to the orthodox line.
Still, some research work and eye-witness accounts by Chinese people outside the official apparatus have appeared,
mostly in Hong Kong and Taiwan but also on the mainland. In spite of official attempts to bury the memory of that
time, and against the grain of unreliable nostalgic recollections of some of their contemporaries, some former Red
Guards and educated youth have managed, against all the odds, to put together an authentic and critically aware
"people's" memory. These scattered islands of memory of China’s “lost generation” are under constant threat of
submersion, but they are worth our attention, not only because they are essential for the future of China but also
because the Cultural Revolution was an event of global significance.
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1. See especially, He Fang, Dangshi biji — cong Zunyi huiyi dao Yan’an zhengfeng (Notes
on the history of the party — from the Zunyi conference to the Yenan rectification move-
ment), Hong Kong, Liwen chubanshe, 2005, pp. 633-702.
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truthfulness gives way to political expediency, which is de-
fined in its turn by the leadership’s response to the current
situation. In addition, stereotypical versions of “good” and
“bad” replace historical complexity; setbacks and mistakes
are not mentioned or are played down, and successes are
greeted with triumphant exaggeration. In short, History is
simply pressed into the service of political interests.
Following the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978,
the CCP gave up its utopian goal of the ideological transfor-
mation of human nature, but it continued to use ideology as
a means of legitimising its hold on power and preventing the
emergence of new ideas that might threaten it. Since that
turning point, the Party has kept up its traditional production
of official history, which includes recent history, as was
clearly demonstrated in June 1981 when the 6th plenary ses-
sion of the 11th Central Committee adopted the “Resolu-
tion on several questions concerning the history of our Party
since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.“
The very title of this resolution shows that it should be seen
as a continuation of the 1945 version; the same characteris-
tics that we have seen defining that earlier “historical resolu-
tion” are to be found here as well. The difference is that the
first resolution established the cult of Mao, whereas the later
one tried to protect the Great Helmsman by minimising his
“mistakes” and laying the blame for nearly all the crimes of
the Cultural Revolution on Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.
With regard to collective memory, the Party has continued
its efforts to mould it according to its will, whether by printed
or audiovisual propaganda, school textbooks, public cere-
monies, or any other means. For example, since 1997 lists
have been drawn up containing several hundred geographi-
cal sites designated as “bases for patriotic education.“ Stu-
dents, cadres, model workers, and the population at large are
all encouraged to partake in “red tourism” by visiting these
sites and becoming familiar with the lofty deeds of the he-
roes of the Chinese nation, among whom the Communist
revolutionaries are given pride of place.((2)
On the other hand, the official attitude with regard to histor-
ical research on the post-1949 period has generally been to
promote forgetfulness and to forbid serious academic investi-
gation. One of these “forbidden areas” has been, and still is,
the “Cultural Revolution,“ defined officially as the 10 years
between 1966 and 1976. In the late 1970s and the early
1980s, negative accounts of the period were encouraged on
condition that they were aimed against the Gang of Four and
not against Mao. But nowadays further study of that decade
has not been allowed, because it might endanger Mao’s
image and legitimacy, and consequently those of the Party,
which has no other guiding model to replace him. However,
we should note that some extremely heterodox views on the
Cultural Revolution were able to find an outlet during the
very short period between the end of 1978 and the autumn
of 1979, when the publication of parallel journals (minban
kanwu) was tolerated. At that time, it was a matter of using
the “democracy wall” movement to support Deng Xiaoping’s
legitimacy against the Party conservatives, but as soon as the
new leader had achieved his goal the movement was sup-
pressed.((3) The two most significant contributions were writ-
ten by former Red Guards and educated youth from
Guangzhou. The first of these was “A short analysis of the
Cultural Revolution” by Liu Guokai, the first draft of which
went back to 1971. It appeared in a special issue of the par-
allel journal, The Voice of the People (Renmin zhi sheng),
founded by Liu in December 1980.((4) This was probably the
first history of the “three years of the Cultural Revolution” to
be written, and the first to insist that the movement gave
China’s youth a small taste of the freedoms theoretically guar-
anteed by the Constitution. It also welcomed the “awakened
consciousness” to which the movement gave rise in quite a
number of former Red Guards. The other text was penned
by Wang Xizhe, who was a member of the Li Yizhe group,
well known for putting up a wall newspaper in Guangzhou in
1973, and a democracy movement activist in that city in the
late 1970s. Entitled “Mao Zedong and the Great Cultural
Revolution,“ it asserts both that Mao was not really an
enemy of the bureaucracy and that a spin-off of the Cultural
Revolution, not intended by the Great Helmsman, was the
production of a “reflective generation” capable of taking a
critical stance towards the official ideology.((5) Even if this
idea is suggested throughout Liu’s article, it is Wang’s that
provides the first formulation of the term “Cultural Revolu-
tion by the people,“ to which we will return.The  history of  an epoch and of  a  generation
Despite the official silence that has been continually im-
posed since that time, there exists nowadays a wide range of
books and articles in Chinese dealing with the Cultural Rev-
2. Information on this tourist programme can be found on one of the websites dealing with
“official memory”: www.xibaipo.com
3. See Victor Sidane, Le Printemps de Pékin, Gallimard, collection Archives, 1980.
4. At that point, most of the parallel journals were forced to close and those that continued
to appear were no longer distributed publicly. In 1981, even private distribution was for-
bidden, and all the journals had to close.
5. Wang Xizhe, “Mao Zedong yu wenhua geming,” Shidai, Hong Kong, February 1981.
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olution. They cover the spectrum from the officially ap-
proved to the dissident, but a large number of them are not
published on the mainland, and are therefore not easily ac-
cessible by the citizens of the PRC, except by those living
in Hong Kong and Macao.
Offic ia l,  s emi-o ffi cial,  o r o ffi cia llytolerated  hi sto ri es
It could well be said that the only official history of the Cul-
tural Revolution, the one always quoted officially, is set out
in the passage dealing with that historical episode in the
“Resolution” of 1981. During periods of relative “liberalisa-
tion,“ however, the CCP has tolerated the publication of
semi-official histories. Out of the three main works that fall
under this category, and are briefly introduced in Wang
Youqin’s article in this issue,((6) two (one by Gao Gao and
Yan Jiaqi, and the other by Wang Nianyi) were published
during the relatively liberal period before the turning point
on 4 June 1989. The third work, by Jin Chunming, was the
only one to appear after that point.((7) During the following
year Jin also published, jointly with Xi Yan, a Short history
of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, which was intended to
serve as a kind of textbook on the topic.((8) In 1998, a group
of experts on Party documents and archives also received
permission to produce a completely orthodox history, which
came out the following year. This has the advantage of pro-
viding a semi-official account of the major events of the pe-
riod between 1966 and the famous 3rd plenary session of
the 11th Central Committee at the end of 1978. This ple-
nary session in fact represented a more decisive historical
turning point than the arrest of the Gang of Four, even
though the one could certainly not have happened without
the other. Moreover, this group’s identification of a 12-year
historical period deserves to be considered more satisfactory
than the usual “10 years of the Cultural Revolution.“ How-
ever, their work has one serious flaw; it does not reference
its sources, whereas the other official works at least provide
some reference material whenever it is not considered to be
“secret.“((9)
It is obvious that all these writers have deliberately formu-
lated their analyses in conformity with official views and
that, as Wang Youqin observes, their work suffers from
being limited to official documents and sources, and to cer-
tain Red Guard publications. Nonetheless, there are differ-
ent gradations within the “official” quality of their separate
contributions. For example, as Wang Nianyi says (op. cit. p.
559), although his book received official approval from the
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, it was
the product of personal research, and it clearly expresses his
desire to struggle against the consignment of those painful
historical events to oblivion (p. 556). In his 1988 postscript
he also explains that, being unconvinced by the official ver-
sion of a particular matter, he opted to leave it out com-
pletely (p. 558). And in his postscript to the second edition
of 1994, he even acknowledges his work’s limitations, partic-
ularly with regard to his omission of the large number of the
victims in 1966 (p. 558). Of course, these attempts at self-
criticism and distancing himself from the official line do not
undermine Wang Youqin’s generally justified criticism.
To those works that seek to provide a comprehensive view
of the period we should add another kind of semi-official
publication, namely the collections of contributions from var-
ious authors focused on particular issues. These are gener-
ally more analytical than factual and documentary. The two
most important of such works are without doubt “An assess-
ment 10 years later: collected historical essays on the Cul-
tural Revolution,”((10) published in 1987, and “A return to
the Cultural Revolution - analysis and reflections on the 10
years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,”((11) published in
2000. These two works, like that of Xi Yan and Jin Chun-
ming, were published by official outlets for works related to
the history of the Party, and this gives them a semi-official
character, underlined further by the fact that the main au-
thors are professional Party historians. However, it should
be noted that the second of the two collections covers a
wider intellectual range. Although it opens with contribu-
tions from some of the most conservative Party intellectuals,
such as Hu Qiaomu and Hu Sheng, there is also a contri-
bution from Yin Hongbiao, a historian who lectures in inter-
national relations at Peking University, and who for several
6. Gao Gao & Yan Jiaqi, Wenhua da geming shinian shi (History of the ten years of the Great
Cultural Revolution), Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1986; Wang Nianyi, Da dongluan de
niandai (The time of the great chaos), Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988 (republished in
1992 and 2004); Jin Chunming, Wenhua geming shigao (An outline history of the Cul-
tural Revolution), Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1995.
7. It should be noted, moreover, that the official in charge of the Sichuan People’s Publica-
tions who published it was later reprimanded by the authorities in charge of propa-
ganda.
8. Xi Yan & Jin Chunming, Wenhua da deming jianshi (Brief history of the Cultural Revolu-
tion), Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996.
9. Yang Shengqun & Tian Songnian (eds), Gongheguo zhongda juece de lailongqumo
(1966-1978) (The circumstances pertaining to the major political decisions in the PRC,
1966-1978), Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1999.
10. Tan Zongji et al., Shinian hou de pingshuo - “wenhua da geming” shilunji, Zhonggong
dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987.
11. Zhang Hua et al., Huishou “wenge” - Zhongguo shinian “wenge” fenxi yu fansi (2 vols.),
Zhonggong danshi chubanshe, 200.
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years has taken a keen personal interest in the history of the
Cultural Revolution. This non-professional concern has al-
lowed him to broach topics completely outside the scope of
official research, such as the heterodox ideas to be found
among the youth or the role of “social contradictions” dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution.
The works dealing with this period fall into three major cat-
egories. The first deals with the phase that could indeed be
called “revolutionary,“ during which the population, even if
it was being manipulated, participated in overthrowing the
established leaders. Here the Red Guards played a major
role, which was brought to an end with their disbandment
and the restoration of the political order by the Ninth Party
Congress in April 1969. The works of this first kind focus
on the period known as the “Three Years of the Cultural
Revolution” (san nian wenge). Officially sanctioned re-
search, by contrast, usually focuses on the inner-Party power
struggle that broke out violently in 1966 and only ended (al-
beit provisionally) with the death of Mao, followed by the
arrest of the Gang of Four. Works of this kind therefore deal
with the “10 Years of the Cultural Revolution” (shi nian
wenge). Another important category of works deals with the
movement to send the educated youth to the countryside
(shangshan xiaxiang yundong).((12) Partly as a means of get-
ting rid of the Red Guards, the movement was launched in
1968 and lasted until 1980. It was unquestionably a part of
the history of the Cultural Revolution, being both its early
product and its later prolongation.
This movement left a deep mark on a whole generation, and
it was the subject of a semi-official interpretation in 1987 in
the contribution to the collection entitled An assessment 10
years later cited above.((13) But 10 more years were to pass
before the appearance of a real semi-official history in the
form of two companion works under the editorship of the
former chief of the Central Office for Educated Youth, Gu
Hongzhang.((14) Although they are dated 1996, these two
works only appeared in 1997, after last minute adjustments
to their contents. It was only thanks to the help of Zhang
Hua, a research worker at the Research Centre on the His-
tory of the Party, that they obtained their final imprimatur.
In a Note to the Reader slipped into one of the works, the
editors emphasise the orthodox and officially approved na-
ture of their book; their project was first approved by the
Ministry of Labour, followed by permits from the Office for
the Press and Publications, from the Propaganda Depart-
ment, and finally from the experts at the Research Centre
on the History of the Party. Their very insistence shows
that, even for such officially favoured writers, the topic was
still very sensitive. Shortly afterwards, however, in 1998
(which was the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the
movement but was also a relatively liberal year), the author-
ities went further by not preventing the Academy of Social
Sciences from publishing a history of the movement that was
not only far more detailed but also less constrained by the
official version. Liu Xiaomeng published a high quality aca-
demic study of 875 pages on the movement that was
launched in 1968, while Ding Yizhuang put out a shorter
work on the despatch of the educated youth to the country-
side before the Cultural Revolution.((15) These two writers
were in a situation comparable to that of Yin Hongbiao in
the sense that although they were research workers at the
Academy of Social Sciences, their official area of research
was the history of the Manchu dynasty. Their historical work
12. On this movement, see T. Bernstein, Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages —
The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China, Yale University Press, 1977; T. Scharp-
ing, Umsiedlungsprogramme für Chinas Jugend, 1955-1980, Institut für Asienhunde,
1981; M. Bonnin, Génération Perdue: le mouvement d’envoi des jeunes instruits à la
campagne en Chine, 1968-1980, Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences so-
ciales, 2004.
13. Zhang Hua, “Shilun ‘wenhua da geming’ zhong zhishi qingnian shangshan xiaxiang yun-
dong” (A discussion of the movement to send educated youth to the countryside and the
mountains during the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’), in Tan Zongji et al., op. cit., pp. 141-
155.
14. Gu Hongzhang, Hu Mengzhou et al., Zhongguo zhishi qingnian shangshan xiaxiang
shimo (A history of the movement to send the  educated  youth of China to the country-
side), Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1996; Gu Hongzhang, Ma Kesen et al., Zhongguo
zhishi qingnian shangshan xiaxiang dashiji (Annals of the movement to send the edu-
cated youth of China to the countryside), Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1996.
15. Liu Xiaomeng, Zhongguo zhiqing shi: Dachao (1968-1980), (A history of the educated
youth of China: the great tide (1968-1980)), Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998;
Ding Yizhuan, Zhongguo zhiqing shi: Chulan (1953-1968), (A history of the educated
youth of China: the first waves (1953-1968)), Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998.
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The historian Liu Xiaomeng at the time he was sent
down to the countryside and today (All rights reserved).
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on the xiaxiang movement arose purely from personal interest
and was rather disapproved of by their respective Institutes:
History in Ding’s case, and Modern History in Liu’s. Al-
though official tolerance was not unconditional, and the au-
thors had to accept several excisions, the publication of their
two books was nonetheless a step forward in building a histor-
ical understanding of this period by the Chinese themselves.
Unfortunately this step did not herald an abandonment of the
restrictions weighing on this field of study, and problems seem
to have arisen over simply reprinting these works. 
History is always subject to the leadership’s assessment of the
stability of its own dominance. This assessment is in constant
flux, and from this point of view it is clear that Jiang Zemin’s
replacement by Hu Jintao as general secretary of the CCP
has brought no improvement, but rather the reverse. For ex-
ample, at the time of the 30th anniversary in 1996, several
round table discussions and study days were organised by re-
search institutions, and two journals (Qingnian baokan shijie
and Jiaodian) dared to produce dossiers or special issues. An-
other one, the well known intellectual journal Dongfang, had
an important special issue ready for publication in May but
was instructed to change the topic. By contrast, for the 40th
anniversary in 2006 no conferences or publications were al-
lowed. Only one small round table discussion could be held
that year, in complete secrecy, from 24 to 26 March.((16)
Safe  havens for  Hi sto ry :  publi cationsoverseas,  in Taiwan and in  Hong Kong
Given these conditions, it is hardly surprising that many
works by mainland Chinese writers have been published
abroad, in Taiwan, and especially in Hong Kong. The latter
still partly retains the leading role it has always played in the
study and knowledge of Chinese affairs, as a colony trans-
formed into a “territory” and then, after 1997, into a Special
Administrative Region. Not only is Hong Kong the main
centre of publication for critical intellectuals seeking to pro-
duce genuine historical work on the Cultural Revolution, but
also, in a supreme irony, the only place where it is possible
to publish the memoirs of former communist leaders who
used to have nothing but contempt for the capitalist colony
(in some cases, these are posthumous publications organised
by their families). Among the latter works are to be found
the memoirs of such figures as General Wu Faxian, which
contains many insights into the Lin Biao affair, the conser-
vative Maoist ideologue Deng Liqun, the former Beijing
leader Wu De, and the former leader from Shanghai, Xu
Jingxian.((17)
Some of the intellectuals who have published in Hong
Kong, such as Xu Youyu and Tang Shaojie, still live in
China, while others, like Wang Youqin and Song Yongyi,
live in exile abroad. It is not possible to list here all the works
relating to the Cultural Revolution that have been published
in Hong Kong. Among them, a book by Xu Youyu provides
a sensitive analysis of the developing outlook of the Red
Guards and the educated youth, and he tries to give a com-
prehensive answer to the question as to who the “rebel” Red
Guards were, and what motivated them.((18) Song Yongyi
and Sun Dajin give several examples of heterodox thinking
that appeared during the Cultural Revolution taken in its
broadest sense,((19) and Wang Youqin has published a work
based on her own lengthy research, which sets out in detail
everything that is known about the circumstances surround-
ing the deaths of 659 victims of the movement.((20) On the
occasion of its 40th anniversary, Liu Guokai published a
four-volume collection, including his first work cited above,
together with more recent writing such as his “Theory of the
People’s Cultural Revolution.”((21) Other works deal with
particularly bloody episodes, such as the 1968 massacres in
Guangxi((22) or the affair of the so-called “Inner Mongolian
People’s Party,”((23) while still others give historical accounts
of the Cultural Revolution in specific institutions, such as Ts-
16. However, it should be noted that one conference was organised by the University of
Bohai from 17 to 19 May on “The gathering and managing of historical material con-
cerning the Cultural Revolution.” See Xu Youyu, “Zhimian lishi: Zhongguoren dui wenhua
da geming de yanjiu” (Facing up to history: Chinese studies dealing with the Cultural
Revolution), a paper given at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,
2 June 2006.
17. Wu Faxian, Suiyue jiannan - Wu Faxian huiyilu (Difficult years - the memoirs of Wu Faxian)
(2 vols.), Beixing chubanshe, Hong Kong, 2006; Deng Liqun, Shierge chunqiu (1975-1987)
(Twelve Springs and Autumns — 1975-1987), Bozhi chubanshe, Hong Kong, undated; Wu
De, Shinian fengyu jishi - wo zai Beijing gongzuo de yixie jingli (A chronicle of 10 troubled
years - some experiences of my time working in Beijing), Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe,
Hong Kong, 2004; Xu Jingxian, Shinian yi meng - Qian Shanghai shiwei shuji Xu Jingxian
wenge huiyilu (A 10-year dream - memoirs of the Cultural Revolution by the former Party
secretary on the Shanghai city council, Ma Jingxian), Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi,
Hong Kong, 2004. 
18. Xu Youyu, Xingxingsese de zaofan - Hongweibing jingshen suzhi de xingcheng ji yanbian
(Every kind of rebellion - Formation and development of the Red Guard mentality),
Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, Hong Kong, 1999.
19. Song Yongyi & Sun Dajin, Wenhua da geming he tade yiduan sichao (Heterodox Thoughts
during the Cultural Revolution), Tianyuan shuwu, Hong Kong, 1997. Song has also writ-
ten a work about the massacres and compiled a CD of Cultural Revolution material, both
of which are published in Hong Kong (see the article by Wang Youqin in this issue).
20. See her article in this issue.
21. Liu Guokai, Renmin wenge congshu si juan (A collection of works on the People’s Cul-
tural Revolution, in four volumes), Boda chubanshe, Hong Kong, 2006.
22. Xiao Ming, Guangxi menge tongshi gouchen (A Painful History: Cultural Revolution in
Guangxi Province), Xin shiji chubanshe, Hong Kong, 2006.
23. Gao Shuhua & Cheng Tiejun, Neimeng wenge fengyu - Yiwei zaofanpai lingxiu de
koushushi (Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia - Oral History of a Rebel Leader),
Mingjing chubanshe, 2007.
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inghua University((24) or the Foreign Ministry.((25) We should
also stress the very important role played by the Hong Kong
press in the historical debates and reflections upon the Cul-
tural Revolution. Independent Hong Kong political journals
such as Zhengming, Dongxiang, and Kaifang regularly pub-
lish articles on the subject. The academic journal Ershiyi
shiji (21st Century) has also played a crucial role, especially
with its publication of four special issues for the 30th an-
niversary in 1996, the articles of which were later published
as a book,((26) and again with its publication of additional ar-
ticles for the 40th anniversary in 2006.((27) Among the Tai-
wan publications are two noteworthy works by a Tibetan
writer, Woeser (Weise), which throw new light on the Cul-
tural Revolution in Tibet. One is a detailed commentary ac-
companying many photographs left by her father, who was a
professional photographer at the time;((28) the other is an oral
historical record consisting of 23 personal accounts by peo-
ple who lived through the Cultural Revolution in Tibet.((29)
With regard to the photographic records of the movement,
we should also note the collection of the former official pho-
tographer Li Zhengsheng, part of which was published in
the United States and France in 2003 and includes photo-
graphs of the public humiliation of some well known lead-
ers.((30) In the United States a considerable role has been
played by the journal Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu (Modern
China Studies), published in Princeton by some resident
Chinese intellectuals with “pro-democracy” backgrounds.
Of course, quite apart from these printed publications, the
development of the Internet has created new possibilities for
spreading current research and analyses of the Cultural Rev-
olution.
The existence of spaces of freedom outside China, or on her
margins, has allowed debates between historians to take
place. One topic of heated discussion is the idea mentioned
already, of “a people’s Cultural Revolution.“ According to
this theory, there were “two Cultural Revolutions”: the offi-
cial one, which was a power struggle led by Mao against
leaders whom he considered his enemies, and the people’s
version, which took advantage of the freedoms provisionally
granted by Mao to defend their interests and pursue their
own goals. The proponents of this theory insist on the im-
portance of the “social contradictions” of the time in shap-
ing both the actions of the Red Guards and the way the
events developed, whereas the defenders of the “single Cul-
tural Revolution” thesis tend to explain it solely by recourse
to the “political contradictions” between Mao and those he
accused of “taking the capitalist road.“ As is frequently the
case, those who acknowledge the huge complexity of the
Cultural Revolution are certainly the more convincing. With-
out denying that the “big chaos” intended by Mao gave cer-
tain groups the opportunity to defend their social interests
and to begin questioning the ideological basis of the regime
(which in the long run has not been without its conse-
quences), these thinkers insist nonetheless that the initiative
always remained in Mao’s hands, and that the bureaucratic
system itself was not fundamentally shaken. Consequently,
the “second Cultural Revolution” was largely subordinate to
the first. This issue, while not being entirely identical with
the choice between “three years” or “10 years” to demar-
cate the period of the Cultural Revolution, is closely linked
to it, since the power struggle was not resolved until 1976,
whereas explanations relying on “social contradictions” be-
come far less clear-cut for the period after 1969, when the
Red Guards were suppressed and disbanded and the Party
was reconstituted at the 9th Congress.
Another contentious subject is that of the “rebel” Red
Guards, who were completely demonised by the authorities,
but have become “rehabilitated” to a certain extent by de-
fenders of the concept of the “Cultural Revolution by the
people.“ But there are still differences of opinion regarding
the socio-political provenance and motives of these rebels.
One of the contributions made by Xu Youyu’s book cited
above is to show that there is no straightforward answer to
the question (not all the rebels were malcontents with a bad
social background), and that circumstances could vary from
region to region.((31)
This brief survey of the historical writing on the Cultural
Revolution in Chinese would be incomplete without clearly
stating that the work of foreign experts on the subject, and
24. Tang Shaojie, Yi ye zhi qiu - Qinghua daxue 1968 nian “bairi da wudou” (An Episode of
the Cultural Revolution: the 1968 Hundred-day War at Tsinghua University), The Chinese
University Press, Hong Kong, 2003.
25. Ma Jisen, Waijiaobu wenge jishi (The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry), Zhong-
wen daxue chubanshe, Hong Kong, 2003.
26. Liu Qingfeng (ed.), Wenhua da geming: Shishi yu yanjiu (The Cultural Revolution: Facts
and Analysis), Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, Hong Kong, 1996.
27. Hong Kong’s Chinese University Press which publishes Ershiyi shiji, is also responsible
for a large part of the works dealing with the Cultural Revolution. For many years now it
has played a leading role in research on the topic.
28. He was also a senior PLA officer, and was thus able to take sensitive photographs by
virtue of his position (Editor’s note).
29. Zeren Duoji & Weise, Shajie (Forbidden Memory: Tibet During the Cultural Revolution),
Dakuai wenhua chuban gufen youxian gongsi, Taipei, 2006; Weise, Xizang jiyi (Tibetan
memoirs), Dakuai chuban gufen youxian gongsi, Taipei, 2006.
30. Li Zhengsheng, Le petit livre rouge d’un photographe chinois — Li Zhengsheng et la
Révolution culturelle, Phaidon, Paris, 2003.
31. See Xu Youyu, op. cit. See also He Shu’s criticism of the book by Zhou Lunzuo entitled
Wenge zaofanpai zhenxiang (The true face of the rebels of the Cultural Revolution), at
the following website: http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=11968.
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the debates between them, have played and continue to play
an important role in this area, and have considerable influ-
ence on their colleagues in China or of Chinese origin.
After all, for many years the only serious studies of the sub-
ject were by foreigners. But times have changed, and there
is good reason to think that the future of such historical stud-
ies lies in the collaboration between Chinese and foreign
scholars, with the former playing an increasingly leading
role.Remembering and forget t ing
The work by unofficial Chinese historians is not only aimed
at producing a solid and well reasoned account of the facts
of the past, but also at preserving the population’s memory
of them, and ensuring their transmission to future genera-
tions. As we have seen, even an official writer such as Wang
Nianyi claims this purpose, which is even more pronounced
among the unofficial writers. However, it comes up against
what can only be called a “wilful forgetfulness” on the part
of the authorities.
The of fic ia l  att i tude:  the  missedopportuni ties o f  2006
As we have seen, the Chinese authorities have been ex-
tremely reluctant to authorise even official or semi-official
publications, and in the latter cases permission has some-
times been quickly suspended. In fact, publishing houses
have been warned, just like newspapers and journals (let
alone TV and radio broadcasters), that the Cultural Revo-
lution is a “forbidden area” or at least a sensitive one liable
to severe restrictions. Unsurprisingly, this prohibition does
not appear to have faded with the passage of  time, as
demonstrated by the official attitude in 2006, 40 years after
the movement was launched and 30 years after it officially
ended.
The Cultural Revolution overturned the lives of many Chi-
nese people still alive today, including high ranking officials,
intellectuals, and artists. All of these are the kind of people
who typically reflect on history and shape the collective
memory, and it would seem that the times have changed suf-
ficiently to allow them the necessary historical distance to do
so. The era when Mao attempted to reinvigorate the Com-
munist utopia and “keep politics in control” seems very dis-
tant from China’s present participation in the WTO and the
processes of capitalist globalisation. Is it not possible now for
the Maoist past, including the Cultural Revolution, to be
transformed into History, that is, into a genuine and rea-
soned historical account which would allow the healing of
wounds to begin, and the facts to be handed on to the
younger generations?
It has to be said that this is not the view taken by the lead-
ing officials in China, who are still acutely embarrassed by
the history of the regime that produced them. In response to
the 40th anniversary of the launching of the Cultural Revo-
lution (generally dated back to the Circular of May 16th
1966), not only did the authorities remain completely silent,
but they also issued strict instructions that it was not to be
mentioned in any of the media. There was even a prohibi-
tion on any academic activities around the subject, so that
the major Chinese language conference to commemorate
the event was held in New York from 12 to 14 May 2006,
having been organised by researchers from China working in
the United States. About a dozen historians living in China
were invited but were not allowed to attend. However some
of them, as we have seen, managed to organise a clandestine
conference in Beijing, and a summary of the proceedings
was read out in New York. The proceedings of the Ameri-
can conference, whose title in English was “Historical Truth
and Collective Memory: International Conference for the
40th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution,“ were pub-
lished in Chinese in Hong Kong.((32)
Neither was there a commemoration of the arrest on 6 Oc-
tober 1976 of Mao’s close associates (now known as the
Gang of Four), although it was widely supported by the pop-
ulation at the time. Clearly this absence is explained by the
Chinese government’s wish to preserve a positive image of
Mao himself. The 30th anniversary of the Great Leader’s
death on 9 September  was not accompanied by any analy-
ses or reflections in the press, but an evening of spectacles
in his honour was organised and shown on television. In ef-
fect, while the historical reality of Maoism (especially its
darker aspects) remains taboo, the myth of the founding fa-
ther is raised to the skies.
This desire to sustain a historical myth, together with the in-
tention to maintain a political monopoly on historical inter-
pretation, is incompatible with the development of a critical
history. That is clearly demonstrated by the “Bingdian af-
fair.“ This widely acclaimed supplement to the China Youth
News was temporarily closed by the authorities in early
2006, and its chief editor was sacked. His crime was having
published a long article in which a historian, Yuan Weishi,
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32. Song Yongyi (ed.), Wenhua da geming: lishi zhenxiang he jiti jiyi (The Cultural Revolution:
Historical Truth & Collective Memory), (2 vols.), Tianyuan Shuwu, Hong Kong, 2007.
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criticised the one-sided and twisted version of history in Chi-
nese textbooks, supporting his view with precise examples.
Official anger was no doubt exacerbated by his explicit ref-
erences to the Chinese government’s protests at the time
against the Japanese whitewash in some of their textbook
versions of the invasion of China by the Japanese Imperial
army.((33)
Popular memory versus  off ic ial  amnes ia
Yuan Weishi’s criticisms are shared by a number of histori-
ans and intellectuals who are alarmed by the systematic and
ruthless efficiency of the Chinese government’s control over
history. This is particularly true in the case of the generation
of the Cultural Revolution and the “lost generation”((34) of
former Red Guards and “educated youth” sent down to the
countryside. These people are now frightened by the
younger generation’s complete ignorance or, even worse,
their distorted understanding, of this crucial period in the re-
cent history of China. One distinguishing feature of mem-
bers of the “lost generation” is that they continue to suffer
from the effects of being denied the right to a proper educa-
tion. Only a small proportion of them who managed to pass
the university entrance exams in 1977 and 1978 were able
to benefit from a higher education. When the authorities
reintroduced those exams in 1977, they provisionally allowed
the age of the candidates to be raised, in order to give some
of that generation a last chance at access to a genuine higher
education. This privileged position, combined with a strong
sense of belonging to a deprived generation, made a number
of them feel “a duty to remember.“ One of them is Xu
Youyu, who notes with great concern that younger intellec-
tuals are being led into wishing for a return of the Cultural
Revolution through their misunderstanding of its history. In
his view, it is high time to “face up to history” (the title of
one of his works)((35) and to “rescue the history of the Cul-
tural Revolution” (the title of a lecture that he gave in Paris
in June 2006). Like other intellectuals of his generation, Xu
relies on oral history to compensate for the difficulty of gain-
ing access to historical documents, which are jealously
guarded by the authorities. The aim of a large number of re-
searchers and editors is to encourage the emergence of a
memory of “the people” (mingjian) to stand against official
amnesia. Thanks to their efforts, a considerable number of
documents, eye-witness accounts, and analyses have been
published in Chinese, particularly in Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and the United States, but also in the People’s Republic it-
self. 
Among the early efforts to revitalise that period and to en-
able reflection upon the Red Guards’ experience, special
mention should be made of the film director and experimen-
tal documentary maker Wu Wenguang, who is a member of
that generation. As early as 1993, he produced a film called
1966: My time in the Red Guards, which combined images
from the time with unconventional commentaries from sev-
eral former Red Guards on every aspect of their experi-
ence.((36) One of the eyewitnesses interviewed in the film
was Xu Youyu, who prepared for the 30th anniversary of
the Cultural Revolution a work entitled 1966: Memories of
our generation, which included several contributions based
on personal memories, written by “liberal-minded” intellec-
tuals (that is, spokesmen of the values of freedom). This
work was only able to appear in the short period of tolerance
in 1998, and was quickly suppressed.((37)
One of the favourite means of “rescuing” the memory of
that time is to try to build up an oral history.((38) After pub-
The cover of Xu Youyu’s book 1966: 
Memories of our generation (All rights reserved).
33. See the documentation on this affair in Zhengming, no. 3, 2006, pp. 27-39.
34. For a definition of this generation, see Michel Bonnin, op. cit., and his article, “The ‘Lost
Generation’: Its Definition and Role in Today’s Chinese Elite Politics,” Social Research,
vol. 75, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 245-274.
35. Xu Youyu, Zhimian lishi (Face up to History), Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 2000.
36. Wu Wenguang, 1966: wode hongweibing shidai (1966: My time in the Red Guards),
1993, 3 VCDs. Wu has also published a book in Taiwan about the making of this film: Wu
Wenguang, Geming xianchang 1966 — Yibu jilupian de paishe shouji (Revolutionary site
1966 — Notes on the making of a documentary), Shibao wenhua, Taipei, 1994.
37. Xu Youyu (ed.), 1966: women neiyidai de huiyi (1966: memories of our generation),
Zhongguo wenlian chuban gongsi, 1998.
38. See, for example, Xing Xiaoqun, “Koushu shi yu ‘wenge’ yanjiu” (Oral history and the
study of the ‘Cultural Revolution’), Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu, Summer 2006, pp. 82-93.
lishing his history of the movement to send youth to the
countryside, which was largely based on written sources, Liu
Xiaomeng set about collecting interviews with former edu-
cated youths who had had very different experiences. The
outcome was the publication of his Oral history of the edu-
cated youth of China in 2004.((39) In the same year, the same
publisher (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) put
out the first issue of a journal consisting of a series of works
under the title of Oral History, edited by Wang Junyi and
Ding Dong. This contains interviews conducted by histori-
ans on some generally overlooked, if not totally obscured, as-
pects of twentieth century Chinese history. For many years
now, Ding Dong, who is a retired history lecturer, has been
undertaking the task of rescuing the history of the PRC
from oblivion, taking small but significant events as his point
of departure. He has done this by publishing his own mem-
oirs, but also, and above all, by acting as an adviser to the
journal Old Photographs, which has enjoyed great success
with its readers since 1996. Knowing that an open frontal at-
tack on historical dogma and taboo subjects would be suici-
dal, he has set about rescuing authentic historical fragments,
hoping that they will play a strategic role similar to the so-
called “eyes” in the game of Go, that is by enabling a deci-
sive step forwards from a significant detail towards a compre-
hensive historical understanding.((40) For this reason, this
journal, which has adopted the policy of only publishing ar-
ticles written in the form of commentaries on original photo-
graphs, mostly from personal or family albums, is a gold
mine for the historian as well as being a great pleasure to
read. Despite being the first in China to publicise such sen-
sitive events as the 1970 execution of Yu Luoke (who was
condemned for his article in a Red Guard pamphlet criticis-
ing the sad fate imposed on children from politically “bad
origins”), this journal has not subjected to the fury of cen-
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39. Liu Xiaomeng, Zhongguo zhiqing koushu shi (Oral history of the educated youth of
China), Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004.
40. From an interview with Ding Dong on 12 July 2007.
Two issues of the journal Old Photos
edited by Ding Dong (All rights reserved).
sorship.((41) Equally noteworthy is the small journal (consist-
ing of one or more newssheets per issue) entitled Wangshi
(The Past). Largely the work of Zheng Zhongbing, it is
mostly restricted to a small circle of friends and acquain-
tances. Like Old Photos, it is a source of a lot of reliable, if
somewhat fragmentary, information and is of particular inter-
est to the specialist. Some of its documentation deals with
the Cultural Revolution.((42)
The aim of the historians quoted above is to act in such a
way that the people will create “their own history” in the
face of official obfuscation. Beyond their concern with the
historical record, they are trying to build a collective mem-
ory that will be critically aware and free from the ideological
stereotypes of the past. Clearly, such an autonomous mem-
ory would clash with the authorities’ wish to maintain con-
trol, for they are in principle suspicious of everything to do
with the minjian, i.e. anything unofficial or registered in “the
space of the people,“ to translate it literally. The borderline
between the merely unofficial and the actively anti-official is
not fixed, as is shown by a collection of 11 works published
in 2001-2002 by Workers’ Publications (Zhongguo gongren
chubanshe) under the overall title of The popular memory
of the educated youth of China (Zhongguo zhiqing minjian
beiwang wenben). These were all novels based on real his-
torical events, which uncovered some particularly dark sides
of the xiaxiang movement. The general editor, Yue Jianyi,
explains in his introduction to the series that he wished to
contribute towards a genuine memory of the movement by
fighting against the idealised descriptions of those tragic
times. This approach was a great success from the commer-
cial point of view, and Workers’ Publications enjoyed very
satisfactory sales. But the Propaganda Department was far
less satisfied; the series was banned, the general editor was
demoted, and the managing director was summoned by the
authorities. He was not only criticised for the negative con-
tent of the novels, but also for the series’ title. The official
from the Propaganda Department even asked “Minjian, why
minjian? Does that mean it’s against the government?”
Nonetheless, the novels were published and a large number
of copies were sold.((43)
Of course, the memory of being sent down to the country-
side did not wait until recently in order to find some kind of
expression. By the late 1970s it was already finding an out-
let in literary form (to which I will return), and also found
an outlet in collectively published personal memoirs. As time
passed, these collections were more and more frequently ac-
companied by photographs, and sometimes even consisted
almost entirely of the latter. Some collections were put out
by well known publishers and were aimed at the general
public, while others were simply exercises in collective mem-
ory by limited groups of former educated youth sent to the
same rural area. In such cases they often appeared simply
under an author’s name, without the slightest mention of
where they were published or printed. Among the first cat-
egory of collections intended for the general public, one can
feel a great restraint in both the choice of texts and the ideas
they express. But in recent years, despite the tightened con-
trols over publishing, the former educated youth, who are
now in their fifties or even their sixties, have both more self-
confidence and greater financial means for publishing these
collections. They also feel a more urgent need to bear wit-
ness to their experiences before advancing age deprives
them of the means of doing so. Their desire to hand down
these memories to their own children is an additional spur.
As a result, certain “sensitive” subjects related to the cam-
paign to send them down to the countryside are no longer
avoided. The Sichuanese, who are often quite rebellious,
seem to be the boldest in this area. In addition to an inter-
esting book of memoirs by zhiqing sent into the province’s
mountain region before the Cultural Revolution,((44) another
work, by former educated youth from Chongqing and
Chengdu who were sent to Yunnan, draws attention to a
largely tabooed subject: the zhiqing revolt in the late
1970s.((45) The contributors are all former participants in that
great movement of strikes and hunger strikes, which played
a major role in bringing an official end to the policy of send-
ing people to the countryside. Public sales of this extremely
interesting collection were swiftly forbidden, but it continues
to circulate among friends and acquaintances.
Despite these brave “rescue” attempts, the production of a
genuine history and memory of the Cultural Revolution is
far from easy. Compared with the situation of the Jews after
the Second World War, or of the victims of the Soviet sys-
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41. One of the reasons for its continuing survival is that, like Oral History, it does not pres-
ent itself as a journal but as a series of separate publications. Since it is extremely dif-
ficult to get permission to publish a journal, it is a better tactic to publish books because
ISBN numbered publications are less strictly controlled.
42. Wangshi is also the name of a journal-cum-book series very similar to Old Photographs,
which has published several “issues” containing photos and articles on specific periods
of the history of the PRC. It is published by Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe. 
43. According to an interview with Yue Jianyi on 5 August 2005.
44. Deng Peng (ed.), Hunxi Dabashan - Chongqing 1964-1965 lao zhiqing huiyilu (Our soul
is attached to Dabashan — Memories of former educated youth from Chonqing who left
in 1964-1965) (2 vols.), publisher unknown, 2005.
45. Qu Bo & Luo Xiaowen (eds.), Jufeng guaguo yaredai yulin - Yunnan guoying nongchang
zhiqing huiyilu (A hurricane swept over the subtropical forest — A collection of memories
by educated youth from the State farms in Yunnan), Zhongguo guoji sheyejia chubanshe,
2006.
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tem after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that of the Chi-
nese intellectuals is more difficult, since most of the archives
are not accessible, and even some of the known facts cannot
be publicised, because of the political risks. Moreover, cer-
tain historical judgements cannot be made in public, and his-
torical research in the field is subject to many restrictions. It
is therefore impossible at this point to imagine an organisa-
tion like Memorial, which was set up in 1988 in the USSR
thanks to Gorbachev’s glasnost policy.
There is room for expression, as we have seen, in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and other places overseas, but customs con-
trols prevent outside publications from reaching a wide main-
land readership. That is why for several years the Internet
has played an important role in disseminating articles com-
memorating the Cultural Revolution and the campaign to
send youth to the countryside. However, the Internet is far
from being free of ideological controls. The most outspoken
articles are only to be found on foreign websites, and some
are inaccessible in China because of official blockage. Even
so, some do manage to get past the censorship, thanks to
special software, and above all thanks to the fact that Chi-
nese websites enjoy greater tolerance (or a greater difficulty
in imposing absolute control) than printed publications. The
Internet consequently provides the principal outlet for mem-
ories of the Cultural Revolution, and the extremely “reac-
tive” nature of that medium allows debates to take place,
even if there is never complete protection against interfer-
ence by the authorities.
Another technical advance that favours the expression of
non-authorised memories has been the development of the
digital camera. It is now possible to produce films without
expensive heavy equipment, and film-makers have been able
to take advantage of this advance to produce documentaries
completely outside the official distribution networks. That is
how Hu Jie has produced two films that are outstanding
both for their technical and artistic qualities and for their
contribution to the history and collective memory of the Cul-
tural Revolution. The first of these, Seeking the Soul of Lin
Zhao, tells the story of an exceptional woman who coura-
geously defended her moral and political ideals from 1957
up until her execution during the Cultural Revolution.((46)
The second film, Though I am Gone, is dedicated to Bian
Zhongyun, the first teacher to be killed by her pupils during
the Cultural Revolution. This latter documentary, which is
mostly constructed out of photos taken by her husband after
her death, and out of a painstaking reconstruction of the cir-
cumstances of the time, is a particularly impressive achieve-
ment.((47) Although these two films cannot be shown through
official channels, they have circulate widely as DVDs and
are shown in private, or even in certain institutions such as
universities and research centres; the second of them is avail-
able on YouTube.
The confli ct  between d iff erent  memori es
The struggle waged by Chinese intellectuals conscious of
their “duty to remember” is not only aimed against official
oblivion. It is also a struggle against specific memories that
they consider inaccurate or distorted. In fact, as with any im-
portant event, the Cultural Revolution has left more than
one memory, and the different memories are themselves suf-
fused by two opposing responses, nostalgia and critical dis-
tance. Nothing could be more banal and widespread than
nostalgia for the days of one’s youth, particularly when those
days were part of exceptional times that have left strong
traces in their wake. Even those intellectuals who are most
fiercely critical of the Cultural Revolution and the campaign
to send the youth to the countryside tell agreeable or inter-
esting personal anecdotes about those times. But they are
opposed to the huge wave of uncritical nostalgia that swept
through a large segment of their generation in the 1990s,
whether in the form of exhibitions of objects and photo-
graphs, the opening of theme restaurants recalling the edu-
cated youth sent to this or that region, or the production of
films, articles, photo albums, and various knickknacks. They
see in all this a culpably complacent acceptance of the prop-
46. Hu Jie, Xunzhao Lin Zhao de linghun (Seeking the Soul of Lin Zhao), 100 minutes, two
VCDs, 2004.
47. Hu Jie, Wo sui siqu (Though I am Gone), 67 minutes, one VCD, 2005.
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aganda spread about both then and now, particularly in the
abuse of the revolutionary icons and songs of the time. 
This nostalgia is in fact officially encouraged, and it is cer-
tainly no accident that the first big exhibition on the xiaxi-
ang movement was opened with great fanfare in 1990
shortly after the events of June 1989, and moreover in the
Beijing History Museum, that is to say, on Tiananmen
Square.((48) This was clearly a matter of officially endorsing
one memory in order to conceal another more recent and
politically dangerous one. Furthermore, the markedly official
nature of the exhibition imposed its own orthodox set of in-
terpretations, filtered through the nostalgia evoked by the
display of yellowing photographs and old maize stalks.
The variety of different memories is a natural phenomenon.
In the late 1970s these found expression in literature, the
only realm in which popular memory was allowed an outlet
(albeit still under the control of the censorship). Writers
with differing sensibilities expressed their personal re-
sponses, especially to the rural experience of their genera-
tion, since the Red Guards period remained a taboo subject.
Two of these writers even produced a form of oral history as
early as the 1980s through the publication of collections of
interviews.((49) In the 1990s, a large number of publications
were collections of memoirs. This period also saw the ap-
pearance of works with a historical purpose, along with arti-
cles investigating the fate and particular characteristics of
that generation, and asking what attitudes it should take now
towards its experiences and the times that it lived through. 
Heated debates were conducted through various publica-
tions, and increasingly on the Internet, over a saying that had
become the slogan for those who proclaimed their pride in
their past experiences: qingchun wuhui, which could be
roughly translated as “I regret nothing of my youth.“ Two
leading ideas are simultaneously expressed in this slogan: on
the one hand, it states that the young people of that time
lived through a significant period and that they made a con-
tribution to the country at the cost of great personal sacri-
fice; on the other hand, it claims that they are not responsi-
ble for the decisions made at that time, since they were sim-
ply forced to participate collectively in movements launched
by the authorities. Their critics maintain, on the contrary,
that their lost youth cannot fail to cause them regret, given
that all the sacrifices demanded from them were in vain, and
that they were robbed of their right to an education, manip-
ulated for political reasons that did not concern them, and
sacrificed for projects with catastrophic economic and eco-
logical results.((50) But there are still others who think that
they should feel not only regret but also remorse, because
they were not merely victims. They participated in the vic-
timisation of others, particularly when acting as Red Guards
or as collaborators of one kind or another in the political ac-
tivities of the time. So there has also been a debate as to
whether that generation ought to “repent” (chanhui) or
not.((51)
Clearly there is a political subtext to these debates. Those
who take a critical position towards their experiences are
also those who want the introduction of political changes to
prevent a possible recurrence of such events, and the elimi-
nation of the remnants of the system that allowed them to
happen. Their opponents are more easily satisfied with offi-
cial declarations and, to put it bluntly, with official amnesia.
There are many complex reasons behind this attitude. Apart
from the fact that the population as a whole is not used to
criticising and taking control of its own affairs, the present
generation has obviously had difficulty coping with the
socio-economic disruptions of the last decade, which have
increased their inability to adapt to post-Maoist society. The
millions of the unemployed dismissed from State enterprises
are mainly members of this generation. Their expressions of
pride in the past can therefore be seen as a way of reassert-
ing their deeply threatened identity, and as an indispensable
consolation for a generation that finds itself sacrificed  yet
again. Moreover, neither cultural tradition nor the political
system encourages public repentance from those who have
real reasons for it. Faced with such a painful past, many see
silence and forgetting as the only solution, even though there
have actually been some cases of Red Guards publicly ask-
ing for forgiveness from their former victims.The  Memory Archipelago
In conclusion, unofficial memory does exist, but as an archi-
pelago whose little islands are threatened by the vast sur-
rounding ocean of official oblivion. If the scattered and lo-
calised attempts to construct a social memory on the basis of
diverse and contradictory individual memories are to have
48. The catalogue for this exhibition was published the following year as Hun xi hei tudi (Our
soul is attached to the black earth), Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1991.
49. Feng Jicai, Yibaige ren de shinian (One hundred people’s ten years), Jiangsu wenyi
chubanshe, 1991; Zhang Xinxin & Sang Ye, Beijingren (Man from Beijing), Shanghai
wenyi chubanshe, 1986.
50. Good examples of this latter point can be found in a collection of articles produced by a
journalist from the People’s Daily who is a great “rescuer of memory”: Li Hui (ed.),
Canque de chuang lanban - Lishi zhong de hongweibing (The ruined guide rail - the Red
Guards in history), Haitian chubanshe, 1998.
51. A book on this issue was published and subsequently banned: Yu Kaiwei (ed.), Chanhui
haishi bu chanhui (To repent or not to repent), Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2004.
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any chance of success, what is needed is an uncensored and
unbiased public space in China. This would have to be suf-
ficiently stable to allow debate to leave lasting traces, which
would then enable them to accumulate and become the
basis for reasoning. At present, such a space for discussion,
exchange, and transmission to the new generations does not
exist, because the regime would not tolerate it. Those who
are fighting against the obliteration of the present genera-
tion’s memory, and who wish to see the emergence of a gen-
uine and detailed history of the Cultural Revolution, are in
a minority and have limited resources. Even though the au-
thorities no longer have absolute power to suppress the pro-
duction of critical histories or the expression of unauthorised
memories, it must be recognised that, given the current rela-
tionship between the one-party State and society, the possi-
bility of China developing a true historical understanding of
the twentieth century depends upon a change of attitude by
the authorities. Admittedly, there is no sign of such a change
at the moment, but a time could come when it might be seen
as necessary, in view of the problems that the current situa-
tion is causing the government.
It can happen that the manipulation of History rebounds on
those responsible for it. In this instance, the actual effect of
the preservation of the myth of Mao, and more specifically
the obfuscation of the real history of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, has been to inculcate in the population an ideal image
of the revolutionary past, which brings unfavourable compar-
isons with the corruption and inequalities characteristic of
today’s China. I recently attended an informal meeting of
students at Peking University, and I was struck by the extent
to which Maoist ideology still has a critical force for them.
Being ignorant of the realities of Maoism, they were in a sit-
uation not unlike Western students in the 1960s, with their
enthusiasm for the Little Red Book.
Since no one can guarantee any major shift of official policy
in the future, there remains a heavy burden on the shoulders
of the “lost generation,“ or at least on those who are con-
scious of their “duty to remember.“ And it can be said with
confidence that some of them will not give up the struggle
over memory without a fight. There is a great deal at stake
here for the future of China. And it ought also to be a mat-
ter of great concern to all of us outside China, or on its mar-
gins, who have the means to help in developing a proper
knowledge and understanding of that astonishing and tragic
period of world history. •
• Translated by Jonathan Hall
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